Ricci Flow, Dr. Hamilton, Dr. Milind Tambe, Blockchain, Nash Equilibrium

Hi Guys,

I have been talking about Blockchain, Ricci Flow, Nash equilibrium & game theory for a while.

Few updates on it -

1. Hamilton from Columbia University joined Hawaii University as a Guest Faculty to teach Ricci Flow.

2. Evolutionary game theory, Ricci Flow & Blockchain to view Blockchain as Geometric flow & stronger cybersecurity -
Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2021/1258730/

One update which this paper can use is using Ricci Flow, geometric flow (taking inspiration from Tracy Payne's lecture from Idaho State University which I mentioned in my earlier blogpost along with Dr. Milind Tambe's book on Game Theory & Security Systems..) as follows - 

Evolutionary game theory is a continuous model with interactions (frequency dependent selection). e.g. the classical Lotka-Volterra predator-prey system fits into this framework. Another example is an infinite population of people playing the game rock-paper-scissors in continuous time. Obviously, if almost everyone is playing rock, the trend will be for more people to play paper. Asymptotic behavior, Nash equilibria and stability of fixed points are studied.

This framework may also be used to analyze the evolution of geometric structures. The Ricci flow is exactly a “replicator equation of quadratic type” for evolutionary game theory. New evolutionary models for various types of geometric flows are put forward.

Hence application of Evolutionary game theory, the classical Lotka-Volterra predator-prey system with The Ricci flow as exactly a “replicator equation of quadratic type” for evolutionary game theory for defense strategy. 

For Example - 

Defense Strategy Selection Model Based on Multistage Evolutionary Game Theory - https://www.hindawi.com/journals/scn/2021/4773894/

The existing network attack and defense analysis methods based on evolutionary games adopt the bounded rationality hypothesis. However, the existing research ignores that both sides of the game get more information about each other with the deepening of the network attack and defense game, which may cause the attacker to crack a certain type of defense strategy, resulting in an invalid defense strategy. The failure of the defense strategy reduces the accuracy and guidance value of existing methods.